$9.99 on Kindle, Nook, Apple Books, Kobo, Google PlayThe Change in the European Balance of Power, 1938-1939: The Path to Ruin by Williamson Murray (170,000 words, 11 illustrations)
“A thoroughly documented study of the years of Hitler's triumph — which the author sees as anything but inevitable. He emphasizes Germany's economic difficulties — lack of raw materials and foreign exchange — and sees an objectively weak but strong-willed Germany challenge a strong but weak-willed West, with the British always relying on a worst case analysis of their military strength and a best case analysis of Hitler's intentions. An important study that in many ways returns to an earlier view that the West would have been in a better position to fight a war in 1938 than in 1939, that appeasement promoted what its proponents most feared: German aggression leading to protracted war. The author bolsters a familiar thesis with new evidence and great zeal.” — Fritz Stern, Foreign Affairs
“Professor Murray... [has] mastered an impressive range of archival and published sources (discussed in a trenchant bibliographical essay)... [and] advances a robust, revisionist thesis. By a careful correlation of the economics of German rearmament with Hitler's foreign policy and strategy between 1933 and 1939, he makes a strong case that right up to the outbreak of war Germany was much less thoroughly prepared for a major war than most of her contemporary opponents imagined, or than most historians have realized since... Hitler began a wholesale effort at rearmament from the moment he became Chancellor. Although this rearmament programme was immense, when compared to other European states, it was severely handicapped by Germany's heavy dependence on imported raw materials, insufficient foreign credit and shortage of skilled labour... The occupation of the Sudetenland brought few economic advantages, but the seizure of the remainder of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 yielded an enormous benefit in raw materials, industrial resources, and immediately available guns, ammunition, and tanks... this scholarly and powerfully argued study will not be easily brushed aside: in particular all future students of the subject will have to grapple with Professor Murray's analysis of Germany's economic problems and military deficiencies.” — Brian Bond, The English Historical Review
“Williamson Murray's [book... applies] a reality test to the policies of the great powers in the late 1930s. The test rests on a simple assumption, as irrefutable as it is commonly ignored: military power is the hard, cold cash of international life. Murray's test itself is equally simple: what was the consequence of British, French, and German policies for the balance of power? Judged by this standard, Hitler, as Murray puts it, ‘more often than not made correct strategic decisions.’ Chamberlain and associates ‘made the wrong choice on almost every strategic and diplomatic question that they faced.’ Catastrophe in 1940 was the result. The question Murray poses is ‘how and why were the Germans allowed to husband their strength for [that] great throw of the dice?’... a work that is rich in archival knowledge, sophisticated argument, the occasional subtle dig, and an uncommon sense of the difficulties and ambiguities that face those who must decide. Murray's cogent presentation of the evidence and his uncompromising, uncomforting conclusions are a devastating blow to the ‘revisionist school’ on appeasement, but they are far more than that. This is an essential book for anyone who studies the interwar period or is seriously interested in either the interrelationship of policy and strategy or the nature of relations between states.” — MacGregor Knox, The Journal of Modern History
“Murray offers a masterful survey of the essentials which are background to decision-making in Germany, England and France which produced both the war and the catastrophe for the West in the war's first year. He lays to rest recent efforts to rehabilitate Neville Chamberlain... This monograph is well researched, fully documented, and well written. It tells a significant story, not only for the generation of World War II but for people of any time or place. Political leaders, diplomats and military planners should have this book on their ‘must read’ list. Scholars will be interested in the bibliographical essay and the massive notes which underpin all sections of this important work.” — Robin M. Rudoff, The Historian
“[A]n excellent piece of historical research... a comprehensive, well-written, and well-organized narrative of the key issues affecting the foreign policymaking process in, particularly, Great Britain, France, and Germany. It is based upon a wide range of primary source materials in several languages and rightly takes into account political, diplomatic, strategic, military, and economic factors. As such, it is to be recommended as a thorough introduction to the topic and an admirable attempt at historical synthesis.” — Philip M. Taylor, The International History Review